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Directors and Officers Certainly Do Not Get Off Scott-Free,
But Ought We Cut Them a Little Slack?
Holly D. Howes*
But to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives
direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obli-
gations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respects has he failed to
discharge these obligations? And what are the consequences of his
deviation from duty?'
-Justice Frankfurter
I. INTRODUCTION
A corporation is defined as "[ain entity having authority under law
to act as a single person distinct from the shareholders who own it
.... ,"2 It has directors. It has officers. It has creditors. And it has
shareholders or, minimally, one shareholder. Suppose a corporation
has a single shareholder, and that shareholder is a corporation itself
with its own directors, officers, creditors, and shareholders. Imagine a
chain of corporations where each has a single, corporate shareholder.
Now find a man and put him as an officer of this corporation that has
another single, corporate shareholder. Tell this man he is a fiduciary. 3
Tell him he is in charge of an entity "distinct from the shareholder[ ]
who own[s] it.'' But be sure to remind him the shareholders of the
parent company control his fate. Be sure to inform this man that al-
though he has authority under the law to control the corporation as a
* Juris Doctor from DePaul University College of Law anticipated 2008; Bachelor of Arts in
Humanities[Pre-Law from Michigan State University, Honors College, 2004.
1. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 365 (8th ed. 2004).
3. A fiduciary is one "who is required to act for the benefit of another person on all matters
within the scope of their relationship ... [and] owes [that person] the duties of good faith, trust,
confidence, and candor." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 658 (8th ed. 2004).
"Fiduciary" is a vague term, and it has been pressed into service for a number of ends
.... My view is that the term 'fiduciary' is so vague that plaintiffs have been able to
claim that fiduciary obligations have been breached when in fact the particular defen-
dant was not a fiduciary ... but simply had withheld property from the plaintiff in an
unconscionable manner.
Id. (quoting D.W.M. WATERS, THE CONSTRUCrIVE TRUST 4 (1964)).
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 365 (8th ed. 2004).
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single entity, the parent corporation has several methods by which it
could manipulate his decision.5
This man may have an understanding that he has a duty to act as a
fiduciary, but as Justice Frankfurter noted, this is only the beginning.6
To whom does this man feel obligated? Should he begin to give a con-
fident answer, ask him if his answer would change were the corpora-
tion to become insolvent. Should he ask for help, tell him the courts
have given conflicting answers.7 This is the problem facing business
men and women today. This Comment addresses to whom directors
and officers of an insolvent, wholly-owned, Delaware subsidiary cor-
poration owe fiduciary duties and the nature of those duties. Specifi-
cally, it focuses on whether or not duties are owed to the corporation
itself by critiquing the result of In re Scott Acquisition Corp.8 in light
of precedent, theories, and policy.
Part II of this Comment describes relevant case law preceding the
Scott decision.9 It traces case law regarding both duties owed by direc-
tors and officers of a wholly-owned subsidiary and how duties owed
by directors and officers of a corporation change once the corporation
becomes insolvent. 10 A summary of the Scott opinion and the after-
math thereof is also included in Part II.11 A critique of the recent case
law, including In re Scott Acquisition Corp., is in Part 111.12 Further-
more, a solution based on theory and policy, as well as both statutory
and case law, is given in Part 111.13 Lastly, this Comment answers the
question on a few readers' minds already: Why does it matter?1 4 This
Comment concludes that directors and officers of an insolvent,
wholly-owned, Delaware subsidiary corporation should owe fiduciary
duties to the parent corporation and the creditors, but not to the
debtor-subsidiary corporation itself. 15
5. For example, the shareholders often have the power to fire officers, reduce their pay, and
change their benefits. See Eric J. Gouvin, Resolving the Subsidiary Director's Dilemma, 47 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 287, 306 (1996).
6. Chenery, 318 U.S. at 85-86.
7. See infra Part II.
8. Claybrook v. Morris (In re Scott Acquisition Corp.), 344 B.R. 283 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006).
9. See infra Part II.A-D.
10. Id.
11. See infra Part II.E-F.
12. See infra Part III.A-B.
13. See infra Part III.C.
14. See infra Part III.D.
15. See infra Part IV.
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II. BACKGROUND & PERTINENT CASE LAW: DIRECTORS AND
OFFICERS Do NOT GET OFF SCOTT-FREE
Just twenty years ago, the courts began to enunciate some principles
that would make their way to the forefront of this debate in Anadarko
Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle Eastern Corp.16 The courts did not con-
front this issue head-on until late 2003 in In re RSL Corn Primecall.17
This Part traces various precedents to their culmination in In re Scott
Acquisition Corp.18 and concludes with the aftermath of that
decision.19
A. Anadarko: A Fiduciary Duty Is Only Owed to the Parent
First, the Supreme Court of Delaware addressed fiduciary duties
owed by directors of a wholly-owned subsidiary in Anadarko Petro-
leum Corp. v. Panhandle Eastern Corp.20 In Anadarko, the subsidiary
corporation, Anadarko Petroleum Corporation ("Anadarko"),
brought suit against the parent company and former directors of the
subsidiary for breach of fiduciary duty to prospective stockholders. 21
Panhandle Eastern Corporation ("Panhandle"), the parent company,
originally wholly-owned the subsidiary Anadarko. 22 However, Pan-
handle voted to spin-off the subsidiary23 and began to create a market
in conjunction with the New York Stock Exchange for Anadarko's
new stock.24 Panhandle then restructured contracts between itself and
Anadarko in anticipation of their new relationship.25 Anadarko sued
once the spin-off was complete, claiming the defendants breached
their fiduciary duty when they modified contracts to the disadvantage
of the prospective shareholders. 26 Upon beginning its analysis as to
whether a fiduciary duty was owed to prospective shareholders, the
16. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171 (Del. 1988).
17. The Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of RSL Primecall, Inc. v. Beckoff (In re RSL
Corn Primecall), No. 01-11457, 2003 WL 22989669 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2003).
18. Claybrook v. Morris (In re Scott Acquisition Corp.), 344 B.R. 283 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006).
19. See infra notes 20-129 and accompanying text.
20. Anadarko, 545 A.2d at 1171.
21. Id. at 1172.
22. Id.
23. As defined by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, a spin-off is where
"a parent company distributes shares of a subsidiary on a pro rata basis to the parent company's
shareholders." U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Spin-Offs, http://www.sec.gov/answers/spinoffs.htm
(last visited January 15, 2008). Furthermore, a separate company results once the spin-off is
complete. Id.
24. Anadarko, 545 A.2d at 1173.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1172.
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court set out some basic premises of Delaware corporation law. 27 One
premise was that directors of a wholly-owned "subsidiary are obli-
gated only to manage the affairs of the subsidiary in the best interests
of the parent and its shareholders. '28 Ultimately, the court held no
fiduciary duty was owed to prospective shareholders because duties
were only owed to the parent corporation. 29 Therefore, the court af-
firmed the lower court's decision to grant Panhandle's motion for
summary judgment.30
B. Geyer: Directors and Officers of Insolvent Corporations Owe a
Fiduciary Duty to the Insolvent Corporation's Creditors
Anadarko was the first glimpse at to whom directors and officers of
wholly-owned subsidiaries owe a fiduciary duty. Generally, directors
and officers of a wholly-owned subsidiary do not owe a fiduciary duty
to the corporation's creditors.31 Creditors are entitled only to what
they contract for in an arms-length transaction. 32 If a corporation does
not repay the money owed to creditors, the creditors can sue the cor-
poration for breach of contract. 33 Of course, this assumes that the cor-
poration has not dissolved and has money to pay the creditors. Geyer
v. Ingersoll Publications Co. addressed the duty owed by directors and
officers of an insolvent company to its creditors.34
In Geyer, the Court of Chancery of Delaware addressed duties gen-
erally owed by directors of companies that have become insolvent.35
Ingersoll and Geyer incorporated their former partnership in a news-
paper company called Ingersoll Publications Company ("IPCO"). 36
Ingersoll bought out Geyer's interest in the company and then failed
to make the contracted payments to Geyer.37 Geyer brought suit
against Ingersoll.38 He alleged IPCO was insolvent and, as the director
of IPCO, Ingersoll owed Geyer, a creditor, a fiduciary duty.39 Geyer
27. Id. at 1174.
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. Anadarko, 545 A.2d at 1177.
30. Id.
31. WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 849 (2006).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992).
35. Id. Geyer did not address these duties in the parent and wholly-owned subsidiary context,
but merely in the context of insolvent corporations generally. See generally id.
36. Id. at 786.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 785.
39. Geyer, 621 A.2d at 787.
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further alleged Ingersoll breached his fiduciary duty when he gave up
sizable assets for his own personal benefit.40 Ingersoll moved to dis-
miss Geyer's complaint arguing it failed to state a cause of action
upon which relief could be granted. 41 However, the court denied In-
gersoll's motion to dismiss, holding a fiduciary duty to creditors arises
once a company becomes insolvent.42 Furthermore, the court rea-
soned precedent and the plain meaning of the word "insolvency" sup-
ported the conclusion that a fiduciary duty arises only once a
corporation becomes insolvent in fact, rather than arising only once
statutory proceedings are initiated.43 Therefore, Ingersoll owed Geyer
a fiduciary duty once the corporation became insolvent, and, as a re-
sult, the court denied Ingersoll's motion to dismiss.44
C. Interpreting Anadarko in the Insolvency Context: Does the
Insolvency Exception45 Extend to the Wholly-Owned
Subsidiary Corporation?
Within a year of each other, two different bankruptcy courts ana-
lyzed whether directors of a wholly-owned subsidiary owe a fiduciary
duty to the subsidiary corporation itself when the subsidiary becomes
insolvent.46 Both courts may have given an answer for the specific par-
ties in question, but, taken together, the opinions left interpretation of
40. Id. at 791 (The complaint alleged "Mr. Ingersoll caused IPCO to give up an asset worth
approximately $50 million for consideration primarily paid to Mr. Ingersoll... [and] Mr. Inger-
soll caused IPCO to cancel valuable management agreements . , in return for consideration
paid to Mr. Ingersoll.").
41. Id. at 790.
42. Id. at 787.
43. Id. at 787-89. Scholars and courts have referred to the holding in Geyer as the insolvency
exception. See, e.g., Prod. Res. Group v. NCT Group, 863 A.2d 772, 791 n.58 (Del. Ch. 2004);
Harvey R. Miller, Corporate Governance in Chapter 11: The Fiduciary Relationship Between
Directors and Stockholders of Solvent and Insolvent Corporations, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1467,
1482 (1993). Cases following the Geyer precedent extended the insolvency exception to corpora-
tions in the "zone of insolvency," also referred to as the "vicinity of insolvency." See, e.g., Credit
Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'n Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613,
at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991); Weaver v. Kellogg, 216 BR. 563, 584 (S.D. Tex. 1997). The zone
of insolvency line of cases is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a more detailed examina-
tion of the zone of insolvency, see Brian E. Greer, Fiduciary Duties When the Corporation is in
the Zone of Insolvency, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26 (Nov. 2006).
44. Geyer, 621 A.2d at 790.
45. Generally, directors and officers only owe creditors the rights they have contracted for.
Steinberg v. Kendig (In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc.), 225 B.R. 646, 653 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1998). However, the insolvency exception is an exception to this general rule; it creates a
fiduciary duty owed by directors and officers to creditors. Id. The rationale for this rule is
economic in the sense that decisions made by the directors and officers while the corporation is
insolvent directly affect the value of creditors' claims. Id.
46. See The Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of RSL Primecall, Inc. v. Beckoff (In re
RSL Coin Primecall), No. 01-11457, 2003 WL 22989669 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2003); Collins
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Delaware statutory law in a state of unrest. The Southern District of
New York answered the question of whether a fiduciary duty is owed
by the directors and officers to the Delaware subsidiary corporation
itself in the affirmative, 47 while the District of Arizona answered it in
the negative. 48
The Southern District of New York addressed whether a fiduciary
duty was owed to the Delaware subsidiary corporation itself in In re
RSL Corn Primecall.4 9 In RSL, litigation focused on one segment of a
long line of parent and subsidiary companies.50 RSL Corn North
America wholly-owned RSL Com U.S.A. who in turn owned a couple
of other subsidiaries. 51 RSL Com U.S.A, its subsidiaries, and their un-
secured creditors sued RSL Corn U.S.A.'s directors and officers. 52 The
plaintiffs alleged the defendants secured debts for RSL Corn U.S.A.'s
parent company "without any independent analysis or evaluation...
[and] without giving due regard to the interests of RSL [Com]
U.S.A. '5 3 Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged the defendants guaran-
teed this debt when the subsidiary company already had more than six
hundred million dollars in net losses and, therefore, "prolong[ed] the
corporate existence ... well past the point of insolvency." 54
The numerous arguments and claims presented by the plaintiffs in-
cluded an allegation that the officers and directors of RSL Corn
U.S.A. breached their fiduciary duties when they wrongfully guaran-
teed the debt for the benefit of the parent corporation.5 5 In response,
defendants claimed they had no fiduciary duty to the subsidiary and
cited to Anadarko for support of this claim.56 The court characterized
the defendants' position as "absurd, ' 57 having "no basis," 58 and ad-
vanced by "quoting out of context statements. ' 59 Specifically, the
court reasoned all of the cases cited by the defendants described du-
ties owed by directors and officers while the company was solvent. 60
v. Kohlberg & Co. (In re Sw. Supermarkets) (Sw. Supermarkets I), 315 B.R. 565 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
2004), vacated in dictum, 376 B.R. 281 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2007).
47. RSL, 2003 WL 22989669, at *13.
48. Sw. Supermarkets 1, 315 B.R. at 575.
49. RSL, 2003 WL 22989669.
50. Id. at *1.
51. Id.
52. Id. at *1, n.1.
53. Id. at *2.
54. RSL, 2003 WL 22989669, at *2.
55. Id. at *11.
56. Id. at *12.
57. Id. at *13.
58. Id.
59. RSL, 2003 WL 22989669, at *12.
60. Id.
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The court held the insolvency exception, which created a special duty
owed to creditors, also created special duties to the subsidiary itself.61
Therefore, the directors and officers owed duties to the parent-share-
holder and creditors; the court expanded these special duties to the
corporation. 62 First, the court reasoned "directors who hold dual di-
rectorships in the parent-subsidiary context may owe fiduciary duties
to each corporation. ' 63 Secondly, the court noted an absence of au-
thority for the defendants' position, again characterizing it as "per-
mit[ting] [the subsidiary corporation] to be plundered for the benefit
of its parent corporation. '64
Among other things, RSL held that directors and officers of a sub-
sidiary corporation owe fiduciary duties to the subsidiary corporation
itself.65 In reaching this holding, the court cited and reinforced the
principles that fiduciary duties are always owed to the single share-
holder 66 and become owed to the creditors upon insolvency of the
subsidiary corporation. 67 The court interpreted Delaware statutory
law and precedent as requiring fiduciary duties to also be owed to the
subsidiary itself once the subsidiary became insolvent.68
The next case to interpret Anadarko in the insolvency context was
In re Southwest Supermarkets; Southwest Supermarkets was a wholly-
owned Delaware subsidiary of Kohlberg & Co. 69 When Kohlberg &
Co. acquired Southwest Supermarkets, Southwest Supermarkets paid
a fee to Kohlberg & Co for acquisition efforts.70 Southwest Supermar-
kets also agreed to pay a yearly management fee to its parent com-
pany, as well as pay Kohlberg & Co.'s tax liabilities.71 Six years after
Kohlberg & Co. acquired Southwest Supermarkets, the wholly-owned
subsidiary filed for bankruptcy.7 2 A bankruptcy trustee was appointed
and the trustee sued Kohlberg & Co. for aiding and abetting breaches
of fiduciary duty by directors of the subsidiary corporation. 73
61. Id. at *13.
62. Id.
63. Id. (citations omitted).
64. RSL, 2003 WL 22989669, at *13.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Collins v. Kohlberg & Co. (In re Sw. Supermarkets) (Sw. Supermarkets 1), 315 B.R. 565,
568 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2004), vacated in dictum, 376 B.R. 281 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2007).
70. Id.
71. ld.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 569.
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Kohlberg & Co. moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which
relief can be granted.74
The court held directors and officers do not owe a fiduciary duty to
the subsidiary corporation itself.75 In its analysis, the court reasoned
the trustee must show either that Kohlberg & Co. owed fiduciary du-
ties to its wholly-owned subsidiary or that the directors and officers of
the subsidiary owed a duty to the subsidiary corporation, which was
breached with Kohlberg & Co.'s help.76 The court began its analysis
by stating a principle announced in Anadarko: officers and directors
"owe their fiduciary duties solely to the single shareholder[.]" 77 The
court interpreted Anadarko as holding duties are not owed to the sub-
sidiary corporation.78 Next, the court turned to the question of
whether insolvency changed this result.79 Kolhberg & Co. argued RSL
held that it did.80 The court, however, limited RSL to its facts; in other
words, the insolvency exception applied only to creditor claims.81 The
court reasoned this was correct because the business judgment rule
does not apply once a corporation becomes insolvent,8 2 and, there-
fore, a higher standard is needed upon insolvency in the creditor con-
text.8 3 The court held this reasoning did not apply to debtor claims. 84
The District of Arizona briefly determined any creditor claims in the
context of this case were barred by the statute of limitations. 85
Once the court expounded the holding of RSL, it further noted all
the things RSL did not stand for.8 6 RSL did not mandate "greater
fiduciary duties become owed to the corporation" or that duties to the
corporation become "owed upon insolvency. 87 Furthermore, other
Delaware law did not suggest this result either according to the
court.8  Therefore, because no support existed for them in Delaware
74. Sw. Supermarkets 1, 315 B.R. at 569.
75. Id. at 576.
76. Id. at 575.
77. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d
1171 (Del. 1988)).
78. Id.
,79. Sw. Supermarkets 1, 315 B.R. at 575.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. See also EDWARD BRODSKY AND M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OF-
FICERS AND DIRECTORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES § 2:10 (2007).
83. Sw. Supermarkets 1, 315 B.R. at 575.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 576.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Sw. Supermarkets 1, 315 B.R. at 576.
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law, the court held fiduciary duties owed by the directors and officers
of the subsidiary corporation to the corporation itself did not exist.89
The RSL court interpreted Anadarko narrowly and Geyer
broadly;90 on the other hand, the Southwest Supermarkets I court in-
terpreted Anadarko broadly and Geyer narrowly.91 Based on very dif-
ferent analyses, the courts came to vastly different conclusions. Before
the federal bankruptcy court for the state of Delaware had an oppor-
tunity to address the issue of whether directors and officers of an in-
solvent subsidiary with a single shareholder owed a duty to the
subsidiary corporation itself, the Chancery Court of Delaware took
another look at the framework and nature of creditors' claims once a
corporation becomes insolvent.
D. Production Resources Group: A Second look at Creditors'
Claims Against an Insolvent Corporation
A month after the District of Arizona worked within the Anadarko
and Geyer precedents to determine that fiduciary duties were not
owed to the subsidiary corporation itself by the directors and officers,
the Court of Chancery of Delaware unveiled the framework of the
nature of creditors' claims against an insolvent corporation.92
In Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., NCT
Group, Inc., a public Delaware corporation, allegedly had been insol-
vent for a number of years. 93 NCT Group, Inc. had millions of dollars
of debt owed almost exclusively to Salkind, a legal secretary and wife
of a former director of the company. 94 Furthermore, paid consultants
of NCT Group, Inc. included eight companies associated with Sal-
kind's family.95 As a lender, Salkind had obtained many shares of
stock as well as liens on all of the company's assets.96 Despite being
unable to hold shareholder meetings because of the company's finan-
cial position, NCT Group, Inc. was alleged to pay "exorbitant sala-
ries" to its directors and officers. 97 Production Resources Group,
L.L.C, a creditor, brought suit alleging the directors and officers of
NCT Group, Inc. breached their fiduciary duty by mismanaging the
company's finances and by paying excessive salaries to certain of-
89. Id.
90. See RSL, 2003 WL 22989669.
91. See Sw. Supermarkets 1, 315 B.R. at 565.
92. See generally Prod. Res. Group v. NC]? Group, 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).
93. Id. at 778.
94. Id. at 780.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 781.
97. Prod. Res. Group, 863 A.2d. at 779-780.
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ficers. 98 The directors and officers of NCT Group, Inc. argued these
facts do not give rise to a fiduciary duty; instead, they give rise to a
duty of care, which "[wa]s exculpated by a provision ... within NCT's
certificate of incorporation." 99
The court initially determined the claims raised by Production Re-
sources Group, Inc. were derivative in nature. 1°° After a lengthy dis-
cussion of the zone of insolvency, the court concluded a cause of
action in this case arose after the company became insolvent.101 The
court cited to Geyer and did not dispute that fiduciary duties are owed
to creditors by directors and officers of an insolvent corporation. 102
Creditors, reasoned the court, are owed fiduciary duties because "by
definition, the fact of insolvency places creditors in the shoes normally
occupied by shareholder-that of residual risk-bearers."'1 03 When
creditors become residual risk-bearers, the nature of the claim for
breach of fiduciary duty does not change from derivative to direct. 104
It does not change because the object of the director's duties, the com-
pany itself, remains the same whether insolvent or solvent. 05 When
directors and officers breach their fiduciary duties and the value of the
firm diminishes, creditors have standing to sue, through the insolvency
exception, even though the claim "is still one belonging to the corpo-
ration.' 0 6 By giving creditors standing, it allows them to "ensure...
any valuable claims the corporation possesses against its directors are
prosecuted."10 7
After establishing creditor claims for breach of a fiduciary duty are
derivative, the court analyzed whether the claims here were excul-
pated due to language in the certificate of incorporation. 108 If found
allegations of mismanagement were exculpated, however, claims of
"conscious wrongdoing through [the company's] transactions with Sal-
kind" remained viable causes of action. 10 9 Therefore, NCT Group,
Inc.'s motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. 110
98. Id. at 780.
99. Id. at 775.
100. Id. at 792-793.
101. Id. at 790-91.
102. Prod. Res. Group, 863 A.2d at 790-91.
103. Id. at 791.
104. Id. at 792.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Prod. Res. Group, 863 A.2d at 777.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 803.
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E. Squaring Production Resources Group with Anadarko: Whether
a Fiduciary Duty is Owed by Directors and Officers of an
Insolvent Wholly-Owned Subsidiary to the
Subsidiary Corporation Itself?
Mid-2006, the United States Bankruptcy Court of the District of
Delaware addressed to whom directors and officers of an insolvent
wholly-owned subsidiary owed duties in In re Scott Acquisition Corp.;
in Scott, a trustee appointed in a bankruptcy proceeding sued the di-
rectors and officers of the wholly-owned subsidiary for breach of fidu-
ciary duty on behalf of the parent corporation, the debtor-subsidiary
corporation, and the creditors.'11 Scotty's Inc. was wholly-owned by
Scott Acquisition Corporation." 2 Scotty's Inc. borrowed money from
Congress Financial Corp. ("Congress") and, in turn, Congress took
security interests in property owned by Scotty's Inc. 1 3 When Scotty's
Inc. failed to make payments on time, Congress directed them to sell
the real estate. 114 Scotty's Inc. sold the real property for less than fair
market value, without soliciting third party offers, to the defendants'1 5
on a sale-and-lease-back basis.116 To add insult to injury, the trustee
further alleged the loans from Congress were "unnecessary . . . and
were entered into at a time when the Debtors were insolvent."' 117
Before filing for bankruptcy, the directors and officers of Scotty's Inc.
reduced their liability insurance limit by more than half.118 The direc-
tors and officers argued the court should dismiss the bankruptcy trus-
tee's claims that were brought on behalf of the subsidiary corporation
because the defendants did not owe a duty to the subsidiary." 9
The court first addressed whether Southwest Supermarkets I sup-
ported the defendant's position that they did not owe a duty to the
subsidiary itself.120 The court disagreed with the Southwest Supermar-
kets I court's interpretation of Delaware law, especially its interpreta-
tion of the Anadarko precedent.' 2' Anadarko addressed a different
issue-that of whether a fiduciary duty was owed to prospective stock-
111. Claybrook v. Morris (In re Scott Acquisition Corp.), 344 B.R. 283, 286 (Bankr. D. Del.
2006).
112. Id. at 284.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. That is, the directors and officers of the wholly-owned Delaware subsidiary corporation.
116. Scott, 344 B.R. at 285.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 286.
120. Id.
121. Scott, 344 B.R. at 286-87.
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holders-than the one presented here, held the court.122 The court
supported its narrow interpretation of Anadarko by citing to other
courts who interpreted Anadarko in the same manner.123
Next, the court determined RSL could be distinguished from the
facts presented in Southwest Supermarkets due to the debtor/creditor
distinction. 124 However, the court was "hesitant" to distinguish the
cases in that manner. 125 Furthermore, the court referred to the hold-
ing in Southwest Supermarkets as "awkward" because fiduciary duties
owed to creditors by directors and officers of an insolvent corporation
are derivative in nature. 26 Therefore, the court concluded a "more
natural reading of Delaware law is that upon insolvency[,] directors of
a wholly-owned subsidiary owe fiduciary duties to the subsidiary and
its creditors.' 27
The court based much of its conclusion on the holding in Produc-
tion Resources when it held officers and directors of an insolvent
wholly-owned subsidiary owe duties to the subsidiary itself. 128 In fact,
the court suggested the court in Southwest Supermarkets reached the
result it did because it "did not have the benefit of Production
Resources."' 29
F. The Aftermath: Southwest Supermarkets
Court Invites Reconsideration
After, and possibly because of, the holding in In re Scott Acquisition
Corp. by the United States Bankruptcy Court in the District of Dela-
ware, the Southwest Supermarkets court "invited the parties to address
whether the [c]ourt should reconsider" its decision.130 Upon reconsid-
eration, the court held directors and officers of a wholly-owned, insol-
vent Delaware subsidiary corporation do owe fiduciary duties to the
122. Id. at 287.
123. Id. at 287 (citing First Am. Corp. v. Skeikh AI-Nahyan, 17 F. Supp. 2d 10, 26 (D.D.C.
1998); In re Mirant Corp., 326 B.R. 646, 651 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005); The Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors of RSL Primecall, Inc. v. Beckoff (In re RSL Com Primecall), No. 01-
11457, 2003 WL 22989669, at *12-13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2003)).
124. Scott, 344 B.R. at 288.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 288-9. (citing Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992);
Prod. Res. Group v. NCT Group, 863 A.2d 772, 791-92 (Del. Ch. 2004); DONALD J. WOLFE, JR.
& MICHAEL A. PrITENGER, CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICE IN THE DELAWARE
COURT OF CHANCERY § 9-2[a] (2005)).
127. Scott, 344 B.R. at 290.
128. Id. (citing Prod. Res. Group v. NCT Group, 863 A.2d 772, 791-92 (Del. Ch. 2004)).
129. Id. at 289.
130. Collins v. Kohlberg & Co. (In re Sw. Supermarkets) (Sw. Supermarkets II), 376 B.R. 281,
283 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2007).
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corporation itself.131 The court noted three reasons for vacating its
previous decision.132
The first reason was that the principal espoused in Anadarko, upon
which the Southwest Supermarkets court had previously based its rea-
soning on, was mere dictum, which, without more, could not "con-
vince [the Southwest Supermarkets court] that Delaware ha[d] made
such a dramatic change in long-settled law."' 133 Citing its previous
reading of Anadarko as "overly broad," the court noted "[the
Anadarko opinion] should be 'confined to its specific facts."' 134
Once the court held the language in Anadarko was dictum, it ex-
amined persuasive authority, citing to several cases to support the
holding that fiduciary duties are owed to the subsidiary corporation
itself.135 First, the court reasoned two federal cases-In re Scott Acqui-
sition136 and VPB LLC v. Campbell Soup Co.137-sustained its hold-
ing and were "entitled to greater weight than" its previous opinion.1
38
Likewise, a Delaware chancery court held fiduciary duties were owed
to the subsidiary corporation, again supporting the court's holding. a
39
Lastly, the court held that "even if Anadarko did divest wholly
owned subsidiaries of fiduciary duties, such a rule [did] not apply...
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. (quoting Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1177
(Del. 1988)).
135. Sw. Supermarkets H, 376 B.R. at 283-84.
136. Scott, 344 B.R. at 287 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (citing Am. Corp. v. Skeikh Al-Nahyan, 17
F. Supp. 2d 10, 26 (D.D.C. 1998) and In re Mirant Corp., 326 B.R. 646, 651 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2005)).
137. VPB LLC v. Campbell Soup Co., 482 F.3d 624 (3d Cir. 2007). The facts in Campbell are
as follows: Campbell Soup wholly-owned VFI. Id. at 627. Campbell created VFI for the sole
purpose of disposing of underperforming subsidiaries. Id. at 626-27. Once created, Campbell
took out a loan under an agreement providing that the rights and obligations under the agree-
ment would be assumed by VFI upon transfer of the businesses. Id. at 627. After selling the
subsidiaries, Campbell Soup issued dividends to its shareholders in the form of stock in VFI. Id.
Three years after the spin-off, VFI went bankrupt. Id. at 627-28. During bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion, VFI assigned all of its claims to VFB. Id. at 628. VFB sued Campbell Soup asserting, among
other things, that Campbell Soup aided and abetted a breach of the VFI directors' duty of loy-
alty to VFI. Id. at 634. Applying New Jersey law, the court held VFI's directors did not breach
their fiduciary duty to VFI because the subsidiary was wholly-owned and solvent at the time of
the spin-off; therefore, its only duty was to act in the benefit of the parent corporation. Id. at 635.
The court noted "it ma[d]e no sense to impose a duty on the director of a solvent, wholly-owned
subsidiary to be loyal to the subsidiary as against the parent company .... A duty of loyalty
against the parent should arise whenever the subsidiary represents some minority interest in
addition to the parent." Id. (emphasis in original).
138. Sw. Supermarkets II, 376 B.R. at 283.
139. Id. at 284 (citing Cochran v. Stifel Fin. Corp., No. Civ.A. 17350, 2000 WL 286722 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 8, 2000)).
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[o]nce the subsidiary bec[a]me insolvent. '140 In other words, if
Anadarko was to be literally read, it did not apply once a corporation
became insolvent because more than one shareholder would exist. 141
III. ANALYSIS
This Part reflects back on the reasoning used in those cases, criti-
ques the analysis in Scott and its building blocks, and provides a solu-
tion to the insolvent subsidiary officer and director dilemma based on
law, theory, and policy.' 42 Ultimately, it concludes directors and of-
ficers of an insolvent, wholly-owned, Delaware subsidiary corporation
should owe duties to the parent corporation and creditors, but not to
the debtor-subsidiary itself.1 43
A. A Second Look at the Building Blocks of the Scott Decision
The Scott decision took a number of premises and attempted to fit
them all together to form a conclusion. Unfortunately, because of the
nature of these premises, the court rested its decision on a rejection of
other options' 44 and vague characterizations 145 rather than citing to
sound legal principles. This portion of the Comment examines those
premises to gain insight as to the building blocks the court used to
make its holding.
1. Anadarko: The Beginning of the End
The Anadarko court made a broad statement when it held "in a
parent and wholly-owned subsidiary context, the directors of the sub-
sidiary are obligated only to manage the affairs of the subsidiary in the
best interest of the parent and its shareholders."'146 The court in
Anadarko used this proposition to support its holding that fiduciary
duties were not owed by the directors and officer of the wholly-owned
subsidiary to prospective stockholders. 147 Read in the context of the
case, the premise appears sound; however, when applied to other fact
patterns and issues, it loses its viability. Some courts have limited the
140. Id. at 285.
141. Id.
142. See supra Part II.
143. See infra Part III.C.4.
144. Claybrook v. Morris (In re Scott Acquisition Corp.), 344 B.R. 283, 288 (Bankr. D. Del.
2006) (rejecting the holding in Southwest because it was awkward).
145. Id. (using words such as "hesitant," "awkward," and "typical" in explaining its
reasoning).
146. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1174 (Del. 1988).
147. Id.
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Anadarko holding to its facts;148 other courts take Anadarko for its
face value and apply it as generally as it was written.
149
Interestingly, the court in Scott does not distinguish Anadarko
based on the solvency/insolvency context. 150 Instead, the court inter-
preted Delaware law as requiring directors and officers to owe a fidu-
ciary duty to the subsidiary and its creditors in an insolvency
context151 and noted other courts agree, 152 but cited to no authority to
uphold either premise. Although parenthetically, the Scott court ulti-
mately found the proper reading of Anadarko was a narrow one.153
Working within this framework, the Scott court moved to the next key
precedential cases: RSL and Southwest Supermarkets.
2. Reconciling RSL and Southwest Supermarkets
The Scott court determined the Anadarko holding should be read as
"confined. ' 154 While this tipped the scales as to which on-point prece-
dent-RSL or Southwest Supermarkets-the court would follow, it did
fully answer whether fiduciary duties are owed to the debtor-subsidi-
ary corporation itself. The Scott opinion never expressly adopted ei-
ther precedent, but one can infer the court believed RSL to be the
better reasoned precedent because the language in RSL, 55 was exten-
sively quoted, while Southwest Supermarkets 56 was criticized.
Turning to its analysis of the RSL precedent, the Scott court cited
the RSL decision as "rejecting the precise argument that the defen-
dant's advance here"'157 and quoted a lengthy portion of the RSL
opinion.' 58 The court then turned its attention to the Southwest Super-
markets decision, and, thereinafter, only mentioned RSL indirectly
when analyzing the reasoning and holding of Southwest
Supermarkets.159
148. See Scott, 344 B.R. 283 at 286; First Am. Corp. v. Sheikh AI-Nahyan, 17 F. Supp. 2d 10, 26
(D.D.C. 1998); In re Mirant Corp., 326 B.R. 646, 651 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005); The Official
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of RSL Primecall, Inc. v. Beckoff (In re RSL Com Primecall),
2003 WL 22989669 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003).
149. See Collins v. Kohlberg & Co. (In re Sw. Supermarkets) (Sw. Supermarkets I), 315 B.R.
565 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2004), vacated in dictum, 376 B.R. 281 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2007).
150. See Scott, 344 B.R. 283 at 286-87.
151. Id. at 286.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 287 ("(describing the holding [in Anadarko] as 'narrow')").
154. Id. at 283.
155. Scott, 344 B.R. at 287-88.
156. Id. at 286-89.
157. Id. at 287.
158. Id. at 287-88.
159. Id. at 283.
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The Scott court was "hesitant" to adopt the Southwest decision, 160
noting it would lead to an "awkward" result.161 Furthermore, the Scott
court claimed the Southwest Supermarkets I court did not understand
that creditor claims are derivative. 162 Implying the Southwest court in
some way failed, the Scott court remarked the Southwest "decision did
not have the benefit of Production Resources. "163 The Scott court con-
cluded its analysis by citing a lengthy portion of the Production Re-
sources opinion, followed by its conclusion that fiduciary duties are
owed to both the subsidiary and creditors. 164
RSL, the decision that the Scott court appears to favor, has
problems similar to those presented in Scott.1 65 RSL also strayed to
blunt characterizations of the alternatives, such as "quoting out of
context statements"1 66 and "absurd" 167 with "no basis," 168 without giv-
ing the reader the benefit of sound legal reasoning. With regard to the
precedent the RSL court does cite to, the court fails to describe how
the principles in those cases apply to the facts at hand.1 69
The RSL court concluded that the position advanced by the defend-
ants had no basis,170 but failed to realize it may be due to the fact that
the issue had not been litigated before in this factual context. The lack
of analysis is disheartening considering the absence of authority171 in
this area of the law. Unfortunately, it occurred not just in these cases,
but continued as the court analyzed the next precedent relevant to this
issue. 172
3. Production Resources
While the Scott decision may be devoid of analysis on this point of
law, the precedent the court cited to is certainly not. 73 In fact, the
Production Resources court goes into an extensive analysis of the na-
160. Scott, 344 B.R. at 288.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 288-89.
163. Id. at 289.
164. Id. at 289-90.
165. The Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of RSL Primecall, Inc. v. Beckoff (In re RSL
Com Primecall), No. 01-11457, 2003 WL 22989669 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2003).
166. Id. at *12.
167. Id. at *13.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. RSL, 2003 WL 22989669, at *13.
171. See Corrine Ball, Distressed Mergers and Acquisitions: Duties of Subsidiary Directors
Run to Subsidiary, Not Parent, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 26, 2006, at 5 (noting RSL is only one of the two
cases that addressed this matter before Scott).
172. See supra notes 157-165 and accompanying text.
173. See Prod. Res. Group v. NCT Group, 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).
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ture of duties owed to creditors by officers and directors of an insol-
vent company.174 However, when explaining the nature of fiduciary
duties, the court fails to cite to any authority supporting its most im-
portant premise: a fiduciary duty is owed to the corporation itself:' 75
Unfortunately, in order to get to the conclusion that duties are owed
to creditors and those duties are derivative in nature, it is imperative
to establish fiduciary duties are owed to the corporation itself.176 Pro-
duction Resources cites this premise many times,177 but each time fails
to support this statement with any statutory or case law.
The Scott court quotes extensively from this reasoned, unsupported
analysis.178 However, it fails to detail how the reasoning in Production
Resources applied to the facts in Scott.179 As stated earlier, the court in
Scott noted the Production Resources opinion was not available for
other precedents, quoted a lengthy portion of the Production Re-
sources opinion, and then gave its conclusion, 8 0 leaving the reader to
assume the connection of the analysis there to the facts presented in
Scott.
4. Summation: A Lack of Reasoning
Scott concluded a "more natural reading of Delaware law" is that
duties are owed to creditors and the subsidiary company upon a
wholly-owned subsidiary becoming insolvent. 181 Unfortunately, the
court did not cite to which Delaware law it was interpreting. 182 Nor
did the court say why this was a more natural reading.1 83 Instead, the
court drew its holding in the same manner it had built up its entire
argument thus far: by merely citing precedent and then directly reach-
ing a conclusion. 184
B. The Aftermath of Scott: A Viable Answer?
Having the benefit of Production Resources and the enlightenment
of a federal court opinion from the Bankruptcy Court of the District
174. Id,
175. Id. at 792.
176. See generally id. at 772.
177. Id. at 792-93.
178. See Claybrook v. Morris (In re Scott Acquisition Corp.), 344 B.R. 283, 289-90 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2006).
179. Id. at 290.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 283.
183. Scott, 344 B.R. at 283.
184. See generally id.
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of Delaware, the Southwest Supermarkets court "invited the parties to
address whether the [c]ourt should reconsider" its holding.185 Al-
though the entire opinion is dicta due to the parties' prior settle-
ment, 186 it is important to examine as a possible answer to the
subsidiary directors' dilemma.
First, Southwest Supermarkets H interpreted the principal in
Anadarko as dictum, so much so that it is "beyond dispute. ' 18 7 Ironi-
cally, the very principle the court had previously relied on as the foun-
dation of its analysis in Southwest Supermarkets 1188 was now
considered to be indisputable dictum. Although the principal an-
nounced in Anadarko189 was not used to determine whether fiduciary
duties were owed the subsidiary corporation itself, it was crucial to
determining the central issue in the case: whether fiduciary duties
were owed to prospective shareholders. If the principle is to be read as
dictum, the word "only" must be read to mean "not to prospective
shareholders," rather than "not to other constituencies." Therefore,
the holding in Anadarko would beg the question: fiduciary duties are
not owed to prospective shareholders because they are only owed to
current shareholders. Dictum or not, it is still a statement by the Su-
preme Court of Delaware and, as such, should be considered
authoritative.1 90
Southwest Supermarkets II also cited persuasive precedents:191
Scott,19 2 VFB LLC v. Campbell Soup Co.,193 and Cochran v. Stifel.194
Part II.A already examined the reasoning used in Scott. The court's
reasoning in Campbell Soup was used by the Southwest Supermarkets
H court as a third reason for vacating its previous opinion; 95 because
185. Collins v. Kohlberg & Co. (In re Sw. Supermarkets) (Sw. Supermarkets II), 376 B.R. 281,
282 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2007).
186. Id, at 283 ("Because the parties have settled this litigation, this opinion has no effect
except to correct an erroneous published analysis.").
187. Id. at 281.
188. Collins v. Kohlberg & Co. (In re Sw. Supermarkets) (Sw. Supermarkets I), 315 B.R. 565
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 2004), vacated in dictum, 376 B.R. 281 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2007).
189. Anadarko Petroleum Crop. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1174 (Del. 1988) (not-
ing directors of a wholly-owned "subsidiary are obligated only to manage the affairs of the sub-
sidiary in the best interests of the parent and its shareholders").
190. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 485 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "dictum" as "[a] statement of
opinion or belief considered authoritative because of the dignity of the person making it").
191. Collins v. Kohlberg & Co. (In re Sw. Supermarkets) (Sw. Supermarkets II), 376 B.R. 281,
283 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2007).
192. Claybrook v. Morris (In re Scott Acquisition Corp.), 344 B.R. 283 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006).
193. VFB LLC v. Campbell Soup Co., 482 F.3d 624 (3d Cir. 2007).
194. Cochran v. Stifel Fim. Corp., No. Civ.A. 17350, 2000 WL 286722 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2000),
affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 809 A.2d 555 (Del. 2002).
195. Compare Campbell, 482 F.3d 624 with Southwest Supermarkets H1, 376 B.R. 281.
[Vol. 6:163
2007] DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS Do NOT GET OFF Scott-Free 181
of this fact, this Section will first discuss Stifel, and then address
Campbell Soup Co., in conjunction with the third reason noted in
Southwest Supermarkets H.
The Chancery Court of Delaware interpreted Section 145 of the
Delaware Code196 in Cochran v. Stifel.197 Stifel Financial wholly-
owned Stifel Nicolaus; Cochran was a director, officer, and employee
of Stifel Nicolaus. 198 Cochran filed a complaint seeking contractual
and statutory indemnification from the parent, alleging he was an
agent of the parent.199 Whether Stifel Financial was statutorily obli-
gated to indemnify Cochran depended on the interpretation of the
language "by or in the right of" used in the code.200 Stifel Financial
alleged that "the Arbitration brought by Stifel Nicolaus against
Cochran was, as a matter of law, also an action 'by or in the right' of
Stifel Financial itself.120 1 In interpreting the statute, the court de-
scribed the statute's effect on traditional corporate law, noting "the
separate existences of a parent corporation and its wholly-owned sub-
sidiary" 202 and the "presumptive independence of the subsidiary
board." 20 3 The court concluded that though it may be a "foolish con-
sistency" 20 4 and "formalistic ,"205 "a suit brought by a wholly-owned
subsidiary is not brought 'by or in the right of' its parent. '20 6
The Southwest Supermarkets II court noted had there been "no fi-
duciary duties owed to the subsidiary," this result could not have been
possible.207 The court's analysis is sound; however, two things are im-
portant to note: the chancery court's reluctance 208 and the supreme
court's avoidance of the issue.209
The final reason the court gave in Southwest Supermarkets H for
vacating its prior opinion is should Anadarko be read to require direc-
tors and officers of wholly-owned subsidiaries to owe fiduciary duties
196. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2006).
197. Cochran, 2000 WL 286722.
198. Id. at *1.
199. Id. at *2.
200. Id. at *11.
201. Id.
202. Cochran, 2000 WL 286722, at *13.
203. Id.
204. Id. at *14.
205. Id.
206. Id. at *1.
207. Collins v. Kohlberg & Co. (In re Sw. Supermarkets) (Sw. Supermarkets II), 376 B.R. 281,
283 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2007).
208. Cochran, 2000 WL 286722, at *14 (using words "foolish consistency" and "formalistic" to
describe the legislature's approach).
209. Stifel Fin. Corp. v. Cochran, 809 A.2d 555, 559 (Del. 2002) (determining the issue to be
moot).
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to the parent, but not the subsidiary corporation itself, insolvency
changes that result.210 The court reasoned Anadarko "does not apply
when there is more than one" beneficiary of the fiduciary duties.211
An insolvent wholly-owned subsidiary is analogous to a solvent corpo-
ration with many shareholders; therefore, because the insolvent sub-
sidiary owes fiduciary duties to the creditors, they must also owe
duties to the debtor-corporation itself.2 12 However, this approach fails
to take into account the practical purpose of most insolvency proceed-
ings. The creditors want as much of their money back as possible; the
shareholders want anything that is left over. The corporation is dis-
solving at worst or starting over from nothing at best. After all, if the
corporation had enough money to pay the creditors and shareholders
and have some money left over, it seems unlikely they would want to
or be eligible for insolvency proceedings. And should one read
Anadarko to mean directors and officers of a wholly-owned subsidiary
do not owe fiduciary duties to the subsidiary corporation itself during
solvency, during the time when the subsidiary can turn a profit, no
purpose would be served by requiring directors and officers to owe
that same subsidiary fiduciary duties when it is insolvent and the fate
of the debtor-corporation is sealed.
C. Finding the solution: Are Fiduciary Duties...
Potentially, directors and officers of an insolvent wholly-owned sub-
sidiary could owe a fiduciary duty to the parent corporation, creditors,
the subsidiary corporation, or some combination of the three. 21 3 This
Comment addresses whether fiduciary duties should be owed to each
constituency in turn.214
1. ... Owed to the Parent Company?
Not only does the law support a fiduciary duty owed to the parent
company,215 but it also makes sense. Anadarko supports the proposi-
tion that fiduciary duties are owed to the parent corporation.216 Al-
though the decision is confined to its facts,217 many cases still cite to
210. Sw. Supermarkets 11, 376 B.R. at 284.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See Gouvin, supra note 5, at 294-309. There are also possible duties owed to customers,
the community, bondholders, suppliers, and so forth, but that material is beyond the scope of
this Comment. See id. at 309-10.
214. See supra notes 172-228 and accompanying text.
215. See Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171 (Del. 1988).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1178 ("Our ruling is specifically confined to Anadarko's claim ... .
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it218 suggesting the holding has more viability than the court realized
at the time. While there is disagreement as to exactly how to interpret
Anadarko,219 two holdings of the case remain clear: a fiduciary duty is
owed to the parent corporation 220 and a duty is not owed to any pro-
spective shareholders. 221
Directors and officers of a wholly-owned subsidiary owing a fiduci-
ary duty to the parent company is also a logical proposition. As one
scholar phrased it, "it is unrealistic to expect the directors of wholly
owned subsidiaries to do anything but serve the interests of the par-
ent. ' 222 Furthermore, the idea that directors and officers owe fiduci-
ary duties to the parent corporation is so entrenched that it is rarely
litigated,223 although this could merely be due to "other methods [the
parent corporation has available to keep] subsidiary directors in
line." 224
2 . .. Owed to the Creditors?
Turning to a slightly more difficult question, upon insolvency, do
directors and officers of a wholly-owned subsidiary owe fiduciary du-
ties to creditors? Case law appears to answer this question in the af-
firmative. 225 Geyer held, generally, officers and directors of an
insolvent corporation owe fiduciary duties to creditors.226 Further-
more, the Production Resources court held this duty applied even for
directors and officers of a wholly-owned subsidiary.22 7
A number of theories underlie why such a duty arises.228 The court
in Geyer explained a duty arose because there is an "insolvency excep-
218. See, e.g., In re Mirant Corp., 326 B.R. 646 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005); Shaev v. Wyly, No.
15559-NC, 1998 WL 13858 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 1998); Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young,
L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006), affd sub nom Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, 931
A.2d 438 (Del. 2007).
219. Compare The Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of RSL Primecall, Inc. v. Beckoff
(In re RSL Corn Primecall), 2003 WL 22989669 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2003) with Collins v.
Kohlberg & Co. (In re Sw. Supermarkets) (Sw. Supermarkets I), 315 B.R. 565 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
2004), vacated in dictum, 376 B.R. 281 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2007).
220. Anadarko, 545 A.2d at 1171; see also Trenwick, 906 A.2d at 200.
221. Anadarko, 545 A.2d at 1171.
222. Gouvin, supra note 5, at 306.
223. Id. at 306 ("[T]he reported cases dealing with this relationship are scarce."); id. at 324
(stating the parent corporation is unlikely to sue the board of its wholly-owned subsidiary).
224. Id. at 306.
225. See Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992); Prod. Res. Group v.
NCT Group, 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).
226. Geyer, 621 A.2d at 784.
227. Prod. Res. Group v. NCT Group, 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).
228. See infra notes 211-229 and accompanying text.
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tion" to the general contractual duties owed to creditors.229 The hold-
ing in Production Resources rests on the notion that fiduciary duties
become owed to creditors because they step into the shareholder's
shoes and become the residual risk-bearers of a corporation that is
insolvent.230 Still another theory known as the "trust fund doctrine"
holds that when a corporation becomes insolvent, the directors and
officers become trustees of the corporation with the creditors as
beneficiaries. 23'
Regardless of the approach taken, all theories conclude duties are
owed to creditors of an insolvent wholly-owned subsidiary. 232 Pre-
cisely why these duties arise can better be answered after determining
whether fiduciary duties are owed to the wholly-owned subsidiary
itself.
3 .... Owed to the Subsidiary Corporation?
Courts are split as to whether directors and officers of an insolvent
wholly-owned subsidiary owe duties to the subsidiary itself.233 Even
before these most recent cases that directly addressed the issue were
decided, Delaware case law "seesawed back and forth. '234
This Comment argues upon insolvency, directors and officers of a
wholly-owned subsidiary should not owe fiduciary duties to the corpo-
ration itself. A number of cases support this proposition.2 35 For exam-
ple, in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, the court held
that when "it became apparent to all that the break-up of the com-
pany was inevitable," as often is the case in the insolvency context,
"[t]he duty of the board .. .changed from the preservation of [the
company] as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company's
229. Geyer, 621 A.2d at 787 (citing Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 222 (Del. Ch. 1974)); see
also Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors'
Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L.REv. 1485, 1523 (1993) (citing Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland,
N.V. v. Pathe Commc'n Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991)).
230. Prod. Res. Group v. NCT Group, 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).
231. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939).
232. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little? Directors' Fiduciary Duties in the
Vicinity of Insolvency, J. Bus. & TECH. L. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
832504.
233. See The Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of RSL Primecall, Inc. v. Beckoff (In re
RSL Com Primecall), No. 01-11457, 2003 WL 22989669 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2003); Collins
v. Kohlberg & Co. (In re Sw. Supermarkets) (Sw. Supermarkets I), 315 B.R. 565 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
2004), vacated in dictum, 376 B.R. 281 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2007); Claybrook v. Morris (In re Scott
Acquisition Corp.), 344 B.R. 283 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006).
234. Gouvin, supra note 5, at 310.
235. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Sw.
Supermarkets 1, 315 B.R. at 565.
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value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit. '236 The court held this was
so because:
[The board of directors] no longer faced threats to corporate policy
and effectiveness, or to the stockholders' interests, from a grossly
inadequate bid. The whole question of defensive measures became
moot. The directors' role changed from defenders of the corporate
bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the
stockholders at a sale of the company. 237
While the holding in Revlon, Inc. was based on a buy-out context, its
reasoning can be applied to insolvent corporations, especially those
facing dissolution. Delaware law does recognize that directors and of-
ficers "in the parent-subsidiary context may owe fiduciary duties to
each corporation. '238 Therefore, although the law holds the parent
and subsidiary out to be separate entities,239 were it to "became ap-
parent to all that the break-up of the company was inevitable," 240 de-
fensive measures for the benefit of the subsidiary would become
moot.241
Professor Bainbridge provides an illustrative hypothetical in Much
Ado about Little? Directors' Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity of Insol-
vency.242 To demonstrate his position, Bainbridge said as follows:
Suppose the board of directors faces a true zero sum decision, in
which the sole issue is how to divide a static sum between two or
more corporate constituencies .... [In this case,] the value of the
corporate entity by definition will be unaffected by the decision. As
such, [it is] the directors' duties running to specific constituencies,
rather than to the entity, which are implicated in this setting. 243
In other words, if the decision of the directors and officers will only
affect the creditors and shareholders, 244 but not the subsidiary com-
pany itself,245 it is not necessary to have a fiduciary duty owed to the
company. Furthermore, even if a duty were owed to the company, it
236. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (emphasis added).
237. Id.
238. The Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of RSL Primecall, Inc. v. Beckoff (In re RSL
Corn Primecall), No. 01-11457, 2003 WL 22989669, at*13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2003) (citing
Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); In re Digex Inc. Shareholders Litig., 789
A.2d 1176, 1205-06 (Del. Ch. 2000)).
239. See Gouvin, supra note 5, at 323 ("[T]he traditional view of parent and subsidiary corpo-
rations [is that they are] independent corporate entities.").
240. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
241. Id.
242. Bainbridge, supra note 232.
243. Id. at 19.
244. Such as how to distribute assets of a bankrupt corporation.
245. Because the subsidiary company will neither profit nor lose from the decision.
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would not be possible to breach if the company is neither better nor
worse off from the decision.
One court noted Professor Bainbridge "relie[d] heavily on the idea
of the corporation as a nexus of contracts" in coming to such a conclu-
sion. 246 Indeed, there are numerous theoretical frameworks on which
to base decisions on. 247 Perhaps part of the reason courts come down
on both sides of this issue is due to the failure of the courts to adopt
one particular framework. 248 A brief look at the various frameworks
reveals a solution, for the most part, to the subsidiary director's di-
lemma.249 Two of the theoretical frameworks would not require a fi-
duciary duty to be owed to the subsidiary corporation when the
subsidiary was insolvent.250 Another reveals a fiduciary duty is owed
despite the unrealistic standard it holds directors and officers to.251
Finally, the last framework fails to answer the question altogether.252
a. Ad Hoc
In the ad hoc approach, "the facts and circumstances of the transac-
tion in question determine the nature and extent of the duty owed. '253
In other words, there are no set rules or guiding principles because
there is no way "specific rules . . . [could] cover every situation. 254
While this may or may not be the state of law today,255 it by no means
is a sound approach because it fails to give guidance to directors, of-
ficers, and courts.256
b. Contract
Another approach is the contract theory of corporate law. In this
theory, the law fills in the gaps of the contract between the parties
with terms they would have contracted for.257 Under this theory, the
corporation is not a "person" whom duties can be owed to, but rather
246. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 195 n.75 (Del. Ch.
2006), aff'd sub nom Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, 931 A.2d 438 (Del. 2007).
247. See Gouvin, supra note 5, at 324-337.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 324.
250. See infra notes 257-262, 268-271 and accompanying text.
251. See infra notes 263-267 and accompanying text.
252. See infra notes 253-256 and accompanying text.
253. Gouvin, supra note 5, at 325.
254. Id. at 324-25.
255. Id. at 325.
256. Id. at 326 (arguing the ad hoc approach is problematic because it treats similarly situated
persons differently, it is not simple, it is not efficient, and it prevents planning).
257. See id. at 326.
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a nexus of contracts. 258 Professor Bainbridge's illustration fits within
this framework 259 because the corporation is seen as an "intersection
of vast interconnecting . ..contracts between various constituen-
cies; '260 therefore, it merely represents duties owed to the creditors
and stockholders. 261 As detailed above, this approach to corporation
law would find that a duty is not owed to the corporation itself.262
c. Horizontal Conflict
The horizontal conflict approach recognizes conflicting duties arise
in many areas of corporate law, such as duties owed to holders of dif-
ferent classes of stock.263 The solution to determining whether there is
a breach of fiduciary duty, according to scholars that take this view, is
a two prong test: (1) whether the harmful action was undertaken for a
legitimate business purpose and (2) whether it could have been
achieved by less injurious means.264 In essence, the horizontal conflict
approach gives all constituencies standing to sue and imposes a bur-
den-shifting analysis on the parties. 265
Under this approach, directors and officers would have a duty to
the subsidiary corporation because duties are owed to all constituen-
cies. There are two main problems with this theoretical framework.
First, every decision could invariably be made in a way that is less
injurious to one of the constituencies, but in turn more injurious to
another. 266 When a corporation becomes insolvent, inevitably, some-
body is going to lose out. Secondly, expecting directors and officers to
weigh concerns of each of the constituencies, including the corpora-
tion, is unrealistic because the parent company has more power, influ-
ence, and control over directors and officers than does any other
constituency. 267 For example, the parent company, unlike the other
constituency, controls whether or not a specific director or officer re-
258. See id. at 327-28.
259. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 195 n.75 (Del. Ch.
2006), aff'd sub nom Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, 931 A.2d 438 (Del. 2007).
260. Gouvin, supra note 5, at 327-28.
261. And, perhaps, other constituencies.
262. See supra notes 242-246 and accompanying text.
263. Gouvin, supra note 5, at 330-31.
264. Id. at 331.
265. Id.
266. See id. at 332 ("[Tlhe board's actions will always be subject to review for a less harmful
alternative.").
267. See id. at 332 ("The directors are subject to the control of the shareholder. Attenuated
constituent interests that may or may not be sufficiently demonstrated at trial pale by compari-
son to the dominant interest of the shareholder. The subsidiary directors are not free agents but
must do the bidding of the parent..." (citations omitted)).
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tains employment. To have this model work in practice would require
giving the other constituencies such powers. Therefore, fixing this un-
clear and uncertain area of law would disrupt well-settled corporation
law, which would in turn create much bigger problems than the one
presented.
d. Agency
Finally, the last approach scholars take to analyzing corporate law is
the view that directors and officers, despite the fiction the law imposes
of two separate entities in the parent-subsidiary context, are really
simply agents of the parent corporation. 268 Under this approach, not
only do the directors and officers not owe a duty to the subsidiary
corporation, but also they do not owe a duty to creditors.269 This view
relies on the idea that the wholly-owned subsidiary does not truly exist
apart from the parent company, even though the law may impose such
a legal fiction at times. Directors and officers are seen as agents "who
merely do the bidding of the parent," and as such, the parent "is obli-
gated to pick up any other duty that the subsidiary directors would
have owed. ' 270 Most importantly, turning to the context at hand, this
framework would not impose a fiduciary duty owed by the directors
and officers of the subsidiary to the subsidiary corporation itself. Were
such a duty to exist, it would be owed by the parent company.271
4. The Solution
Duties clearly are owed to the parent company in a wholly-owned
subsidiary context. 272 Insolvency of the subsidiary causes directors and
officers to also owe fiduciary duties to creditors. 273 Because of the na-
ture of insolvency and the parent-subsidiary relationship, directors
and officers need not also owe fiduciary duties to the subsidiary cor-
poration itself. Not only would it be redundant, 274 but also it would
provide no guidance to directors, 275 it is inconsistent with certain theo-
268. Gouvin, supra note 5, at 332.
269. Id. at 334-35 ("[I]n the context of wholly owned subsidiaries.... all duties of the subsidi-
aries' directors [are imposed] on the parent, whether these duties run to... creditors, stakehold-
ers or regulators.").
270. Id. at 337.
271. Id.
272. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1174 (Del. 1988).
273. See Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992); Bainbridge, supra
note 232.
274. On a balance sheet, the corporation is made up of stockholders and creditors. See Stein-
berg v. Kendig (In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc.), 225 B.R. 646, 653 n.13 (Bankr. N.D. I11.
1998).
275. See Bainbridge, supra note 232.
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retical frameworks, 276 and other theories fail as viable frameworks
within which to address directors and officers fiduciary duties owed to
an insolvent wholly-owned subsidiary. 277
D. Why does it matter?
Professor Bainbridge argues this is all "much ado about nothing,"
or at most, "much ado about very little. '278 On the other hand,
Gouvin argues that because there is very little litigation on the sub-
ject, "academic commentary [becomes] all the more pressing. '279
While in most cases it may make little difference, there are key con-
siderations that are greatly affected by whether or not duties are owed
to the corporation itself. The fate of the business judgment rule,280
deepening insolvency claims, 281 the effect of exculpatory clauses, 282
and sales of distressed subsidiaries283 hang on the court's solution to
this question. As with many areas of law, if you vary directors and
officers duties in the subsidiary context, these other areas of law will
be affected. It is important to play out the full ripple effects before
making a decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
Directors and officers of an insolvent wholly-owned Delaware-in-
corporated subsidiary ought to only owe duties to the shareholders
and creditors of the corporation. They should not have to owe duties
to the debtor-subsidiary corporation itself. The reasoning and case law
in Scott leaves legal scholars and subsidiary directors and officers with
much to be desired. By taking a second look at Delaware law, policy,
theory, and common sense and piecing them together from scratch, a
more appropriate, logical conclusion to the subsidiary director's di-
lemma is that he or she does not owe a fiduciary duty to the corpora-
tion itself.
276. See supra notes 257-262, 268-271 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 253-256 and accompanying text.
278. Bainbridge, supra note 232.
279. Gouvin, supra note 5, at 324.
280. See Luis Salazar, Fiduciary Duties Are Clarified. Delaware Court Play Up Business Judg-
ment, Drop 'Deepening Insolvency,' NAT'L L.J, Oct. 30, 2006, at 16.
281. See id.
282. See Prod. Res. Group v. NCT Group, 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).
283. Ball, supra note 171.

